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The global expansion of mass schooling has greatly increased opportunities for low-income families, 
and governments have devoted much effort to equalising access and quality in education systems. 
Alongside regular schooling, the so-called shadow education system of private supplementary tutoring 
has grown rapidly across the world. The fact that rich families can purchase more and better quality 
shadow education undermines the achievements of increased equality of opportunities in formal 
schooling. 
Drawing on a mixed-methods study in Shanghai, China, the article shows how shadow 
education has offset school equalisation policies through differentiation of access and through sorting 
mechanisms. Shadow education occupies a space beyond strict government control in which privileged 
families and elite schools ignore and mediate the equalisation policies, seeking competitive advantages. 
Uneven access to shadow education and tracking within it shape, maintain and exacerbate inequitable 
schooling experiences at individual and institutional levels. 
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Introduction 
Families across the globe increasingly find it necessary to invest in private tutoring to supplement their 
children’s schooling experiences. Scholars have begun to recognise the role of such tutoring in learning 
outcomes, school operations, students’ lives, and social stratification (e.g., Roesgaard, 2006; Liu, 2012; Aurini, 
Davies & Dierkes, 2013; Bray & Kobakhidze, 2015). Private tutoring is widely known as shadow education 
because much of its curriculum mimics that in schooling, and changes according to changes in the schools 
(Bray, 1999; 2009). In some cases, the shadow goes beyond the official curriculum and affects the body that it 
imitates with a backwash on schooling.  
Much research on shadow education has focused on educational inequalities. Discussions revolve 
around socio-economic patterns of access to supplementary tutoring, noting that pupils from well-endowed 
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families and whose parents hold higher educational qualifications tend to receive more and better tutoring 
(Silova et al., 2006; Xue & Ding, 2009; Pallegedara, 2012; Bray et al., 2013). Some researchers have looked 
further into government responses, and a few studies have examined tutoring processes and patterns of 
consumption. For instance, a qualitative study in Egypt documented the capacity of better-off students to 
access private lessons and ‘famous teachers’ (Hartmann, 2013); and an Eastern European regional study 
similarly noted strategic use of tutoring by privileged families (Jokić, 2013). However, many of the subtle 
procedures that tutoring uses to define opportunities to learn both within and outside schooling remain 
underexplored. 
Another body of literature in the domain of inequalities focuses on sorting and selection within 
schools through tracking (e.g., Douglas, 1964; Rosenbaum, 1976; Gamoran & Mare, 1989; Oakes, 2005; 
Burris, 2014). The literature has shown that tracking may enact class discrimination, and in particular may 
limit the opportunities of students in disadvantaged groups.  
The present paper shows that tracking happens not only within schools but also within shadow 
education. Focusing specifically on Shanghai, China, it brings together the two bodies of research in the 
context of school equalisation policies. The patterns identified have considerable relevance not only in China 
but also in other parts of the world. The authors commenced by investigating patterns of access to tutoring and 
practices of tracking in shadow education. They then asked how access to tutoring and tracking within it 
shaped socialisation and selection within schools; and thirdly, they investigated the implications of the 
patterns for equalisation of educational opportunities. The paper focuses on fee-paying tutoring received by 
primary and secondary students in academic subjects on a one-to-one basis, in small groups, and in larger 
classes.  
Conceptual framework 
Studies of relationships between shadow education and schooling have demonstrated that goals of equal 
opportunity through expansion of schooling may be subverted by disparities in access to different types and 
qualities of private tutoring (e.g. Dawson, 2010; Bray & Kwo, 2013). For example, government initiatives in 
Japan and South Korea to eliminate entrance examinations to secondary schooling, and to reduce disparities 
between both primary and secondary schools, exacerbated anxieties and insecurities in families striving to 
maintain their children’s competitive advantages. Shadow education expanded in response to perceptions that 
regular schooling was inadequate to guarantee success in high-stakes college entrance examinations (Byun, 
2010; Lee et al., 2010; Sato, 2012; Dierkes, 2013). These experiences are a reminder that efforts to reduce 
educational inequalities should be informed by research on shadow education. 
Within school systems, student opportunities are greatly influenced by tracking, which may be 
defined as ‘the process whereby students are divided into categories so that they can be assigned in groups to 
various kinds of classes’ (Oakes, 2005: 3). Students are commonly placed in curriculum groups on the basis of 
their educational and occupational plans, such as ‘vocational’ or ‘academic’. Ability grouping, by contrast, 
mainly classifies students on academic achievements. The two types of grouping are related, and both may 
 
3 
obstruct broader policies to equalise opportunities (Rosenbaum, 1976; Oakes, 2005; Kelly, 2007). Disparities 
between tracks within schools and variations in tracking practices between schools yield ‘multiplying 
inequalities’ (Oakes et al., 1990) in learning opportunities and instructional strategies (Gamoran et al., 1995; 
Burris, 2014). In the USA, for example, Oakes (2005: 226-229) showed that low-track curricula emphasised 
basic facts and skills, while high-track curricula emphasised concepts and problem-solving. Further, low-track 
teachers spent more time on discipline and seatwork, while high-track teachers focused more on instruction 
and interactions. Also, low-track teachers generally had less experience and fewer qualifications.  
The criteria used for tracking have also been scrutinised. Although the stage at which students leave 
school is commonly viewed as a matter for family and individual choice, aspirations are usually influenced by 
family cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1973). Even if lower-tracked students hold high academic aspirations, their 
chances to fulfil these aspirations are limited by the orientations of the curricula and by social expectations. 
Although scores on standardised achievement tests are commonly perceived as accurate reflections of 
students’ abilities, they may reflect biases in racial, social and economic status. Mercer (1992) noted that 
intelligence and achievement tests were devised by members of the dominant social group and biased against 
poor students, racial minorities and linguistic minorities.  
The labels that tracking attaches to students may also generate social expectations from relatives, 
peers and teachers, and contribute to self-fulfilling prophecies (Oakes, 2005; Rist, 2007; Burris, 2014). High-
track students are likely to be described as ‘bright’, ‘quick learners’, ‘diligent’, and/or ‘successful’, while low-
track students are commonly described as ‘dumb’, ‘slow learners’, ‘lazy’ and/or ‘failures’. Labels are 
transformed into unequal treatment by those using the terms, and internalised by the students.  
Studies of schools undergoing detracking have found that parents of high achieving students resisted 
the efforts to offer a standard curriculum to all students. In the USA, Wells and Oakes (1996) described these 
parents as ‘White and/or wealthy, well-educated, and politically powerful’ (p.138). Underlying such resistance 
were two structural barriers to detracking: the parents’ demand for differentiation, and stratified higher 
education. Tracking and stratification at the secondary level were driven by influential middle-class parents 
desiring their children to enter elite universities. 
The two themes identified above are largely applicable to China, except that most Chinese parents 
find themselves politically powerless to influence the official discourse and district/school practices towards 
equalised schooling, including detracking. Prosperous parents seek alternatives in shadow education 
empowered by a marketplace with little government regulation. The strategies are employed not only by 
middle-class parents but also by high-status schools. Expanded access and detracking in the mainstream are 
subverted by restricted access and ‘retracking’ in the shadow education system. 
The data 
This paper draws on a study that sought to harness the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches (Johnson & Christensen, 2012). The researchers collected survey responses from students in 
Grades 3-9, and interviewed students, teachers and parents.  
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 The survey employed a three-stage stratified sample. First, Shanghai was divided into urban, suburban 
and peripheral areas (Figure 1), from each of which one district was randomly selected. Then in District A and 
District C, two primary schools and two lower secondary schools were randomly selected. In District B four 
primary and four lower secondary schools were selected because the schools and students were significantly 
more numerous than in the other two Districts. In 2014, 908,565 students were enrolled in Grades 3-9 
(Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Statistics [SMBS], 2015), which for a random sample would have required a 
minimum of 651 students with a 0.05 margin of error and 99% confidence level. To account for the design 
effect of multi-stage sampling (Snijders & Bosker, 1999: 22-24), in line with accepted practice the sample size 
was more than doubled to secure the representativeness of the sample. Within each target grade of each 
sampled school, 30 students were randomly selected. This procedure thus delivered a total sample of 1,680 
students in eight primary schools and eight lower secondary schools in three districts. Within the sample, 
1,531 students provided usable responses. 
Figure 1. Three-stage stratified sampling of survey participants 
 
The survey was conducted on-line using a questionnaire adapted from one used elsewhere for a 
similar purpose (Liu, 2015) and then piloted in two local schools. Most students completed the survey on their 
school premises, while others did so at home following briefing by their teachers. The teachers were asked to 
explain clearly and if necessary repeatedly until all the respondents understood the intended definition of 
tutoring in the study. In addition, the questionnaire itself began with the definition of tutoring which the 
respondents were asked to read before answering the questions. The definition also appeared on the sheet 
provided to each student with log-on information for the survey.  
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Initial analysis with descriptive statistics was followed by binary logistic regression to identify 
socioeconomic patterns of access to tutoring using student background information. The regression focused on 
data from students in Grades 6-9, since primary students may not provide reliable data on household incomes 
and parents’ education. Table 1 summarises the variables, measures and codes. When parents had different 
levels of education, the level of the parent with more education was used. Concerning the specifics of Grades 
6-9 (in contrast to the larger sample of Grades 3-9), in 2014, 426,789 students were enrolled (SMBS, 2015), 
which for a random sample would have required a minimum of 377 students with a 0.05 margin of error and 
95% confidence level. The actual sample size was 892, which is 2.37 times the minimum. 
Table 1. Variables used for binary logistic regression 
Variable Measures and codes 
Dependent variable 
Participation in tutoring Yes = 1; No = 0. 
Independent Variables 
Residential status determined by place of 
origin (hukou) 
Two categories: Shanghai = 0; Other regions in 
Mainland China = 1. 
District  Three categories: Urban core = 1; Suburban = 2; 
Peripheral = 3. 
Highest level of parental education Upper secondary or below = 1;  
Associate or undergraduate = 2; Postgraduate or 
above = 3. 
Family monthly average income  <=5,000 yuan = 1;  
5,001–15,000 yuan = 2;  
>15,000 yuan = 3. 
Family size Two categories: Single child = 0; With siblings = 1. 
Gender Two categories: Male = 0; Female = 1. 
Private cars Two categories: No private car = 0; With private 
car(s) = 1. 
Self–assessed Academic Achievement  Excellent = 1; Upper above average = 2; Lower 
above average = 3; Average = 4; Poor = 5. 
 
For the interviewees, the researchers used a combination of purposeful and opportunistic sampling. 
Using maximal variation sampling (Creswell, 2012: 208) to identify the institutions, 30 schools were invited 
to participate among which 12 accepted. Among them were three ordinary primary schools (all public), two 
elite primary schools (one public and one private), two ordinary lower secondary schools (both public), three 
elite lower secondary schools (one public and two private), and two elite upper secondary schools (both 
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public). Among the 12 schools in which interviewees agreed to participate, three were among the 16 schools 
from which survey data were collected. The researchers did not consider it essential to have a direct match in 
the schools for survey and interview data, since the main purpose of the interviews was to elaborate in a 
qualitative way on the patterns revealed by the surveys. 
The teachers and students for interview were chosen with help from the school authorities according 
to availability. The researchers sought balances between females and males, and between students without and 
with tutoring. Tutors, parents and a government official were recruited through opportunistic sampling 
(Patton, 2002: 244). Most interviews lasted between 40-60 minutes, and were conducted in school and tutorial 
centre classrooms. Interviews focused on the reasons for tutoring, forms of tutoring, relationships between 
tutoring and schooling, and impact on parenting and the larger society. Data were collected from 43 students, 
31 teachers, five principals, seven parents, two tutors, the manager of a tutorial centre, and a government 
official. Following the guidelines of Gibbs (2007), transcripts were analysed with thematic coding. 
 
The research site  
Shanghai is widely recognised as China’s international financial, economic and trading centre. Within 
Shanghai’s population of 24.3 million, 14.4 million are classified as permanent residents and 9.9 million are 
migrant workers and others without registered local (hukou) residence (SMBS, 2015). In 2014, Shanghai’s per 
capita Gross Domestic Product was US$15,851 (SMBS, 2015), indicating that households had considerable 
wealth for investment in education and other domains. By contrast, the figure for China as a whole was 
US$7,591 (China, 2015). Shanghai has a substantial middle class exposed to neoliberal forces (Ding, 2011).  
Shanghai has a reputation for piloting educational reforms that have later become national policies. 
The municipality is also known for its scores in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
sponsored by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Sellar & Lingard, 
2013; Tan 2013; Zhang et al., 2011), which have contributed to lessons for other provinces. Yet some cultural 
traditions remain strong despite wider changes (Cheng, 2010; Zhang & Kong, 2012). Families emphasise the 
possibility of success through diligence and of social mobility through education; and children’s academic 
achievements bring prestige to entire families (Chan, 2007). The one-child policy has intensified pressures 
(Liu, 2016).  
Expansion of higher education in China has increased opportunities for the general public but has 
resulted in a highly stratified system with a few top universities and overall inflation of educational 
qualifications. The high-stakes National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao) has become a battlefield in 
which middle-class families compete for access to top universities. Competition and stress at this level have a 
backwash on the Grade 9 examination (Zhongkao) which governs entry to elite upper secondary schools; and 
in turn this examination has a backwash on admissions systems for lower secondary and even primary 
schools. 
Although the authorities value tutoring as an ingredient of human capital and economic 
competitiveness, they worry about the study load on students and about social inequalities (Cheng, 2010; 
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China, 2010; Zhang, 2014). Families also feel stressed by competition, and face dilemmas in which both 
joining and avoiding shadow education are problematic (Yu & Ding, 2011). School personnel are similarly 
ambivalent, desiring whole-person development but also feeling pressurised by performativity in the context 
of competition and marketisation of education. 
Equalising schooling in Shanghai  
Shanghai’s school system has nine years of compulsory education (five years of primary and four years of 
lower secondary), and, in the academic track, three years of upper secondary schooling. Shanghai was the first 
city in China to achieve universal primary and secondary schooling (SEC, 2012), and has also greatly 
expanded higher education. Whereas 67.4% of Grade 12 graduates entered higher education in 2000, 89.0% 
did so in 2014 (China, 2015). Increased educational opportunities have intensified competition for high-status 
institutions which are gateways to elite occupations and further life chances. 
During the 1950s the Shanghai authorities, in line with national policy, designated some institutions 
as key schools (Yang, 2006; Wu, 2014). The schools, which were models for wider improvement, received 
favourable government funding and recruited the best teachers and students. Within the schools, students were 
tracked into key and ordinary classes. As might be expected, students in key schools gained higher test scores 
than counterparts in ordinary schools, and further disparities were evident between rural and urban areas (Xie 
& Tan, 1997: 91-100). Because the key schools privileged urban and elite families, during the 1990s the label 
was officially removed at the level of compulsory education though it remains in common parlance and 
perception. At the secondary level, key schools have been relabelled as ‘experimental demonstration’ schools. 
Leading the cluster of upper secondary key schools are six demonstration schools run by the municipal 
government (SEC, 2013). 
The government has sought to reduce gaps between schools and to equalise educational opportunities, 
particularly focusing on the nine years of compulsory education. In 1999 the municipal authorities initiated a 
reform to standardise facilities of primary and secondary schools, and in 2004 they increased the required 
standards for all schools (Gu, 2011). The measure significantly improved the facilities of ordinary schools in 
poor districts. Recognising the wide disparities in per-student spending across districts, additional finance was 
provided to needy areas (Zhang & Kong, 2012: 154-156). In 2005 the richest district’s spending per primary 
student, at RMB9,759, was 10 times the RMB861 in the poorest district (Gu, 2011: 17). In 2013, by contrast, 
the ratio in compulsory education had been reduced to 1.43 (SEC, 2014) 
Another policy, introduced in 1997, required primary and lower secondary schools to recruit students, 
including migrant children, from their neighbourhoods without entrance examinations (Li, 2007; SEC, 2015a, 
2015b). Accompanying measures required detracking within schools. Primary and lower secondary schools 
were prohibited from ranking students and from allocating high-achievers to key classes.  
The authorities recognised that the nearby-allocation policy would only work well if qualitative 
disparities were reduced between neighbourhoods. In order both to spread quality and to harness the 
leadership of former key schools, the government established ‘educational groups’ in which elite institutions 
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were given responsibility for the performance of partnering schools (Tan, 2013: 74-75; SEC, 2014; 2015b). 
The authorities also affiliated lower-prestige schools to key schools in order to utilise the reputations and 
resources of the latter. Resources were invested in teachers and managers through professional development 
and collaboration between elite and weaker schools (Gu, 2011; Zhang & Kong, 2012; Tan, 2013; SEC, 2014).  
Interviewees for the present study indicated that the measures allowed a larger percentage of low-
achieving and disadvantaged students to enter better-quality schools. The nearby-allocation policy and 
detracking were more strictly enforced in primary than in lower secondary schools, in ordinary than in elite 
schools, and in public than in private schools. In some primary schools, detracking in the form of mixed 
classes enabled desegregation of children from middle-class and poor families. To some extent it also enabled 
desegregation of migrant children.  
However, the policy attracted some backlash. One teacher from an ordinary primary school reported 
that: ‘Shanghai parents don’t want their children to interact with migrant children’. The teacher added that: 
‘Some students in my classes complained about the smell of children whose parents sold vegetables’. This 
sentiment was echoed by students and teachers in other public schools. Recognising such attitudes, some 
schools found ways to maintain previous practices. A teacher in an elite lower secondary school reported that 
most students were high performers from well-off families and that the school had “flexibility not to 
undertake strictly mixed classes”. Interviewees felt that the school equalisation policies had been more 
effective in ordinary public primary schools and least effective in elite secondary schools, especially private 
ones. The government required schools to admit stipulated percentages of migrant children, yet elite schools 
negotiated ways to maximise the intake of high-performing students. Also, many evaded the detracking 
requirements by changing the labels for high-performing classes into ‘experimental/enrichment classes’ or 
‘innovation classes’.  
As household incomes increased and more families became aware of the benefits of key classes, 
competition increased (Wu, 2014). Elite schools and key classes were famous for their Zhongkao and Gaokao 
performance and for promotion rates to prestigious institutions at the next level. To get into these 
schools/classes, advantaged families used economic and social capital to distinguish their children from peers. 
Among the strategies was investment in tutoring, which excluded students who could not afford it and 
provided avenues for ranking and grouping. 
 
Unequalising shadow education in Shanghai: uneven access 
While schooling in Grades 1-9 has become universal, private tutoring has not and thus gives opportunities to 
some students which are not received by others. The research survey indicated that 58.7% of sampled students 
in Grades 3-9 had received tutoring of various types during the previous 12 months. The most popular 
subjects were mathematics (81.5% of those who had received tutoring) and English (76.8%), mainly because 
they were among core components for admissions at all levels. Families invested in tutoring in all grades, i.e. 
not just at the transition points, and demand was heightened by peer pressure.  
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Table 2. Binary logistic models of the access to private tutoring (Grades 6-9) 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
Beta  S.E. Exp (B) 
Community characteristics    
District (Reference: Urban core) 
B (Suburban) -.686*** .187 .504 
C (Peripheral) -.209 .218 .811 
Residential status (hukou) 
(Shanghai = 0) 
-.724*** .178 .485 
Household level    
Highest level of parental education (Reference: Upper Secondary or Below) 
Associate or undergraduate 
 
.192 .174 1.211 
Postgraduate or above 
 
.186 .354 1.205 
Family size (Single child = 0) -.684*** .172 .505 
Private cars (No private cars = 0) .359** .166 1.433 
Family income (Reference: <=5,000 yuan)   
5,001–15,000 yuan .500*** .177 1.648 
>15,000 yuan .719*** .271 2.053 
Individual level     
Gender (Male = 0) .187 .152 1.206 
Self-assessed Academic Achievement .139** .068 1.149 
N (included in analysis) 892 - - 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.131 - - 
Goodness-of-fit test (Hosmer & Lemeshow) 
χ2 12.765 - - 
df  8 - - 
Sig. .120 - - 
Method: Enter. *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01. 
Table 2 shows factors shaping receipt of tutoring. The quantitative analysis showed that after 
controlling for other factors, suburban students were less likely to receive tutoring than urban counterparts. 
Interviews indicated that urban students and parents were more anxious about risk and uncertainties, because 
they had stronger perceptions of competition and experienced greater peer pressures. Residential status 
(hukou)b was also a major factor, with students from other provinces being less likely to participate in tutoring 
than students with Shanghai hukou. Interviews indicated that most students with hukou of other provinces 
were migrants. They had fewer incentives to receive tutoring, partly because they viewed tutoring as a means 
to climb the academic ladder in Shanghai which for them was likely to be a dead end. A school principal 
pointed out that official policies prevented migrant children from taking the Zhongkao and proceeding to 
regular upper secondary schools in Shanghai. Many of those who aspired for upper secondary education 
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returned to their places of origin one or more years before Grade 9 in order to sit the Zhongkao in those 
locations. 
At the household level, families with private cars and higher incomes were more likely to invest in 
tutoring. This matched patterns elsewhere (see e.g. Bray, 2009: 32-34). However, correlations with parental 
education were not statistically significant. One interpretation could be that access to tutoring was determined 
more strongly by parental economic capital than by parental cultural capital. The interviews suggested that 
tutoring was an important strategy to increase family cultural capital for parents who were not well educated 
but able to afford it. Therefore, in order to increase their children’s chances of academic success, parents with 
high incomes would invest in tutoring no matter how much education they had themselves received. At the 
same time, regardless of parental education, students with Shanghai hukou and those in the urban districts 
were generally more competitive and more engaged in the culture of tutoring. Probably for similar reasons, 
the difference between boys and girls in the probability of receiving tutoring was not statistically significant 
after controlling for other factors. 
Children with siblings were less likely to participate in tutoring. Such a pattern partly indicated the 
psychology of parents (and grandparents), who seemed more anxious to use tutoring to increase life chances 
for the ‘priceless’ single child (Liu, 2016). Patterns were particularly salient among middle-class families 
interviewed. They aspired for intergenerational transmission of social status or social mobility, and tutoring 
was ‘outsourced’ to achieve this goal through a prestigious academic trajectory. 
Students were asked to provide their self-assessed levels of academic achievement based on 
performance in major examinations. After controlling for other variables, students reporting higher academic 
levels were more likely to receive tutoring (Table 2). Tutoring seemed to be an enrichment strategy for the 
higher performers, which further widened the achievement gap between the high and low performers. 
Unequalising shadow education in Shanghai: tracking and labelling  
The above patterns of access to tutoring reflect social and academic stratification. Tutoring participation has 
become a label that classifies students into haves and have-nots, and further affects schooling experiences. 
Four fifths of the teachers indicated that parents and students felt unfairly disadvantaged when they 
discovered that other families arranged tutoring. The remark was echoed by most parents and students. One 
parent recalled a feeling of discrimination when the class teacher of her Grade 4 son announced in class the 
list of students receiving tutoring. ‘How can the teacher be so insensitive and discriminate openly against 
children without tutoring?’, she asked. ‘It forced us to start arranging tutoring for his mental and emotional 
health.’ 
The tutoring-participation labels and the labelling in schools reinforced each other. For instance, two 
teachers of (hidden) low-rank classes in a poor-district primary school indicated that few students in their 
classes received tutoring, not so much because of financial constraints but more because they were ‘slow 
learners’ with ‘low learning motivations’. As such, non-participation in tutoring strengthened the teachers’ 
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stereotyping of low-performing students. Another teacher in an urban school made similar remarks: ‘Low-
performing students remain weak even when they have tutors. I only encourage high-performers to attend.’  
In contrast, teachers and parents in elite schools reported that some teachers ‘advised’ low-performers 
to receive tutoring and asserted that they were ‘incapable of catching up in class without tutoring’. Students 
willing to receive tutoring were viewed by many teachers as ‘motivated’, ‘hardworking’, or ‘revivable’. 
Similarly, parents arranging tutoring were considered ‘responsible’, regardless of the effectiveness of tutoring. 
Discrimination also existed among students. When asked how they felt when they received tutoring 
but others did not, two high performers implied that the students not receiving tutoring were lazy or 
unteachable. Other students who identified themselves as high achievers expressed a sense of superiority over 
their peers when receiving ‘special tutoring’. Their perception was influenced by the fact that the type of 
tutoring they received was usually only available to high achievers. 
Ranking the unranked  
Despite the prohibition of ranking, students in most schools that the researchers visited were still ranked on 
their examination scores. However, almost all sampled primary schools restricted the information to school 
personnel, and did not publicly divulge it to parents. The hidden rank was used as reference for teaching and 
guidance. Interviewees stated that when ranking ceased to be officially accessible in schooling, many parents 
became anxious because they believed strongly in the legitimacy of ranking. They ‘felt lost’ and desperately 
sought alternatives to ‘re-rank’ their children so that they could make informed decisions about their 
children’s school careers. Some used social capital to obtain the information from schools, while others turned 
to tutoring companies with chains across the municipality. These companies organised standardised 
examinations in mathematics and English, and ranked tutees of all branches. The rank served three major 
purposes: 1) to meet parental demand for predictors, 2) to offer services on learning and admission 
consultancy, and 3) most importantly, to select tutees and/or place them on different track levels. 
 
Tracking the detracked 
Some tutorial centres track students in the way that schools used to do, i.e. through both ability and 
curriculum tracking. The mechanisms favour privileged high achievers from prosperous families, and are 
factored into school selection processes. 
Ability tracking in tutoring 
Two of Shanghai’s most popular tutoring companies, here called A and B (the top two players, dominating the 
tutoring market), selected tutees through standardised entrance examinations. Almost all the high-performing 
students interviewed in the study had received tutoring in the two companies. One parent indicated that 
families had to line up several months ahead to sit the entrance examination for Company A. The company 
charged monthly fees of RMB10,000 (US$1,200) for Grade 9, which was out of reach for most families. The 
 
12 
entrance examination was the principal mechanism for exclusion of low achievers and for ability grouping 
among those admitted. For example mathematics tutees in Company A were assigned to four tracks: basic, 
enrichment, elite, and special talent class (fourth rank for Grades 1-5) or top class (fourth rank for Grades 6-
9). The first three tracks used the same textbooks but were supplemented with materials of ascending 
difficulty. Instruction in basic classes was the slowest, and focused on repetition and consolidation of 
knowledge foundations. The curricula of the other three tracks were ahead of and more difficult than the 
school curriculum, with speedy instruction. Enrichment classes claimed to train students in analytical skills 
with more difficult exercises than the basic classes, while elite classes trained students for more difficult 
content. The special talent and top classes were instructed by the ‘best’ tutors, most of whom, according to the 
interviewees, were graduates of elite universities or former prestigious schoolteachers with abundant 
experience. The curriculum of this track was far beyond the school curriculum, and tutees had much drilling 
for difficult examination papers.  
 Most tutoring provided by Company A was advanced learning for high performers, and had a 
backwash on schooling. Company A was not the only provider of advanced tutoring in the market, and 
students also learned ahead of the school curriculum in classes provided by Company B and other centres, and 
from school teachers and college students. Teachers, students and parents reported cases in which teachers of 
mathematics, English and Chinese cut basic instruction in school classes because they assumed that most 
students had learned the materials in advance. The phenomenon forced some students to receive tutoring in 
order to keep up. The teachers were then able to accelerate their teaching and add higher-level materials. The 
process thus became a hidden track within the schools.  
Some parents expressed frustration that they ‘had no choice’ but to arrange advanced tutoring so that 
their children could keep up with peers receiving such help. Otherwise, in the words of one mother, her child 
might ‘lose confidence and sink to the bottom of the class’, or, as feared by another parent, would have to 
change to another class or school with ‘slower learners’. When teachers were asked what they could do to 
help such parents, they indicated their dilemma between ‘catering for the majority’ and ‘catering for the few 
have-nots’. Two teachers stated that they were pressurised by the performance indicators and pushed for 
teaching speed by ‘the majority of parents who arranged advanced tutoring for their children’. Some teachers 
complained that students with higher-track tutoring were less involved in the school-based learning because 
they considered it too simple. Some of these students and their parents trusted the tutors more than the 
teachers. 
Ability tracking through school tutorial classes 
Another form of ability grouping was associated with collaboration between schools and tutoring providers. 
Under the pressure for performativity despite the prohibition of tracking, some schools contracted tutoring 
providers for classes with advanced curricula. The lessons were disguised as extracurricular activities but in 
fact were school strategies to increase promotion rates to elite schools.  
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For instance, School A was a suburban public primary school. The teachers and school managers 
indicated that detracking in School A (including desegregation of migrant children) had impeded maintenance 
of promotion rates since the teachers could no longer group the elite students and offer an advanced 
curriculum. Therefore, ‘interest’ (tutoring) classes in English and mathematics were offered (and charged) 
after official school hours for elite students. In this case, tutoring providers were experienced teachers from 
School A and other elite schools.  
Elite primary School B and lower secondary School C contracted tutoring companies to provide such 
lessons to the best performing students. These two schools still secretly allocated higher performers to 
unofficial high-track classes. However, in order to concentrate resources on top students with the potential to 
enter top-ranking schools, they selected a small group (20-30 students) for intensive training through 
arrangement with the tutoring companies. Students admitted to these tutorial classes were selected through an 
entrance examination. Some students sought tutoring elsewhere in order to get into the school-contracted 
tutoring classes. 
These strategies privileged high achievers from affluent families. Some students who were excluded 
felt disadvantaged, while others considered such classes out of reach because the different treatment had 
internalised the perception that they were of ordinary intelligence. 
Tutoring and retracking at school 
As noted above, some schools resisted the detracking reform by inventing counter-measures to retrack the 
students. They either created new labels or kept the high performers in separate classes with no official labels 
and allocated the best teachers. In order to get into such classes, students had to perform far above the 
minimum requirement for admission to corresponding schools. Most students in these classes had received 
tutoring to enter, and maintained tutoring to keep up.  
In lower secondary School D where two out of six classes in Grade 9 were on the hidden high track, 
teachers and students interviewed from the high-track classes reported 90-100% participating in tutoring. 
Three out of four students interviewed received tutoring for high-track placement. By contrast in the ordinary 
classes composed mostly of migrant children, fewer than 5% of students were estimated to receive tutoring.  
Concerning this use of tutoring for retracking and resegregation, one class teacher explained: ‘As you 
have learned, almost all students in this (high track) class receive tutoring. They learn at greater speed than the 
other class (low track, mostly migrant children). If we mix them, the migrant children can hardly catch up and 
learn in class.’ Similar remarks were made by several other teachers and the principal from another lower 
secondary school. While the teachers’ perception was valid, tutoring to some extent reinforced the perception 
that tracking was desirable. 
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Curriculum tracking 
Ability tracking was related to curriculum because it usually involved choice of curriculum as well as ranking 
of academic achievements. Nevertheless, curriculum tracking may be considered to be a separate category. 
Among the many modes of curriculum tracking in tutoring, two deserve particular attention because they were 
closely linked to selection processes in the schools. 
Tutoring for competitions 
Alongside the special talent/top class in Centre A was tutoring for Olympiads and equivalent competitions in 
mathematics, sciences, English, and Chinese. According to the interviewees, the curricula in these classes 
were completely different from school curricula, and only outstanding students were able to access them. 
Interviewees described such students as ‘genius’, ‘smart’, ‘persistent’, ‘independent’, ‘motivated’, and 
‘awesome’. The student interviewees in this category were respected by their peers and valued by relatives, 
tutors and teachers. Teachers and parents expressed high expectations towards such students. One mother 
said: ‘I always remind my child not to rest on his achievements. He has space to climb higher in the rank. I 
believe in him.’ And a mathematics teacher honestly expressed her view that such students had inborn talents 
and should advance further through tutoring. These students appeared very confident and competitive, and 
some considered themselves superior to other students. They had clear visions of career paths, fitting the 
prestigious academic trajectory expected by their parents and teachers. Most were under great pressure to live 
up to the labels. 
The chief purpose of tutoring for competitions was admission to elite institutions. Following the 
abolition of entrance examinations for lower secondary schools, families gained attention by securing as many 
prizes and competitive certificates as possible. Performance in Olympiad mathematics was among the 
perceived necessities for access to interviews by most elite lower secondary schools.  
High-ranking students in the special talent/top class in Centre A were recommended to sit a secret 
entrance examination to enter high-track classes in elite schools and/or secured direct admission. Government 
policies permitted Olympiad winners in particular subjects to secure direct allocation (baosong) with 
exemption from Zhongkao and Gaokao to elite upper secondary schools and high-status universities. Since 
schools were prohibited from providing training in Olympiads because it was beyond the official curriculum, 
interviewees said that it was ‘almost impossible’ to secure baosong without tutoring. 
Grade 4 and Grade 5 tutorial classes 
The special tutorial classes called Xiaosiban (Grade 4 classes) and Xiaowuban (Grade 5 classes) played a 
particular role in admission to elite lower secondary schools. They helped the families to access those schools, 
and they helped the schools to recruit high-performing students. The curriculum in these classes focused on 
lower-secondary knowledge with frequent tests and evaluation. Only the best performers had access to these 
tutorial classes, for which entrance examinations were the gateway.  
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Some tutors of the classes were the students’ existing school teachers, and the tutoring changed 
teacher-student relationships within the schools. Almost all Grade 5 teachers in mathematics and English in 
one primary school that the researchers visited operated such classes in collaboration with an elite lower 
secondary school and with support from their own school managers. Students selected for the classes received 
more attention and free tutoring at school. Two students reported closer relationships with these teacher-tutors 
and corresponding teacher dissatisfaction with students who did not attending the tutorial classes. 
Elaborating on the role of tutoring in selection, Xiaosiban and Xiaowuban were usually arranged 
through collaboration between schools and tutoring providers, and many teachers and school leaders were 
heavily involved. Students were tracked according to their examination grades, and families knew that high 
performers would attract the attention of their tutors and be recommended as potential ‘qualified’ students. 
Students were in addition socialised in behaviour and respect for tutors.  
While schools were detracking, tracking was widely practiced in tutoring. As discussed above, the 
tracking in tutoring introduced new indicators for labelling the high performers from well-off families, 
thereafter concentrating the best resources on them. It facilitated admission of these students to elite 
institutions. These institutions were also enabled in the processes to secure high-performing students and 
maintain their status in the school hierarchy. Tracking also intensified competition and strengthened the 
examination culture in the mainstream system. Half of the teachers interviewed also raised concerns about the 
values that such tutoring transmitted, such as ‘pragmatism’ and ‘selfishness’ over ‘compassion’ and 
‘collaboration’. Thus the schooling was going through tracking/segregation, detracking/desegregation and 
retracking/resegregation via tutoring. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Messages about inequalities that arise from tracking in schools are well established in the literature. Similarly, 
messages about inequalities that arise from shadow education are becoming well established. This paper 
nevertheless adds to understanding by putting the literatures together in a way that, to the authors’ knowledge, 
has not been done previously.  
 The Shanghai government, like many counterparts not only in China but also around the world, has 
devoted much effort to equalisation in schooling. Primary and lower secondary schools have been prohibited 
both from operating entrance examinations and from tracking. They have further been required to recruit 
students from their immediate neighbourhoods. Faced by these constraints, families and elite schools desiring 
advantages in the competitive society have turned to the shadow sector. The large tutorial institutions have 
operated their own tracking systems and entrance examinations, and the schools have received signals on 
which students were high performers and therefore deserving recruitment.  
As in most other parts of the world (Bray, 2009; Aurini et al., 2013; Bray et al., 2013), higher 
socioeconomic families and stronger performers in the education system were more likely to receive shadow 
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education and thus to retain advantages despite the government’s equalisation efforts. Elite schools 
maintained or strengthened their status by securing a quality intake through tutoring and by encouraging 
tutoring participation. The tutoring also restored ability grouping within some schools undertaking detracking. 
Tutoring-created labels shaped students’ relationships with peers, teachers and relatives, disadvantaged low 
achievers, and pressured high achievers to excel further. These were components of what Oakes et al. (1990) 
had called ‘multiplying inequalities’. The corollary was that non-participation in tutoring reinforced labelling 
of low-achieving students in some schools.  
These patterns raise a question whether educational processes can ever be fully equalised. The answer 
seems to be negative – that when governments do succeed in one domain, namely the schools over which they 
have direct control, the sector over which they have less control compensates by operating in its own way. 
Institutions find ways to collaborate in ‘mixing zones’ at the confluence of schooling and shadow education 
(Zhang & Bray, 2017). This observation does not mean that governments should not try to equalise schooling, 
but planners would be wise to recognise their limitations and the extent to which the shadow sector may 
undermine them. They may decide to regulate the shadow sector more fully to limit the extent to which its 
operations counter the schooling policies; but there again they are likely to encounter limits (Bray & Kwo, 
2014).  
Meanwhile, the study highlighted ways in which shadow education had a backwash on schooling. For 
example, students with higher-track tutoring were less involved in the school-based learning because they 
considered it too simple. Some of these students and their parents trusted the tutors more than the teachers. 
Some tutors of the classes were the students’ existing school teachers, and the tutoring changed teacher-
student relationships within the schools. Poorly performing students, especially those without tutoring, 
accepted identities as low-achievers. By contrast, high-achieving students faced considerable pressure to live 
up to expectations, and tutoring resulted in more tutoring. Once again, this paper shows the need for 
educational planners to look outside the schools as well as inside them for sources of educational inequality.  
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